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Summary 
 
 
Governments from around the world will gather in 
Lima, Peru, for the next annual United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) summit Nov 30-Dec 12, 2014. This 
meeting represents an important milestone 
towards defining a new international climate 
change framework for the period from 2020. The 
framework for post-2020 action is to be agreed on 
at the conference in Paris next year.  
Recent announcements by the United States, the 
EU and China on post-2020 emission goals, and 
pledges to climate finance from the USA, Japan 
and others, provide important momentum into the 
Lima conference. 
International climate change negotiations are 
inherently complex as they incorporate 
environmental, economic, security, trade and 
energy issues. Undue emphasis on the politics 
and symbolism of a global treaty has tended to 
overshadow the substantive practical progress 
that has been made. Progress can be difficult, yet 
over the past two decades, much has been 
achieved. 
For example, countries that represent over 80 per 
cent of global emissions now have 2020 emission 
targets, and are implementing policies to meet 
them and drive investment in clean energy and 
low carbon solutions. Many are taking a broad 
view of their national interests and seeking to 
maximise energy security, deliver energy 
productivity improvements, reduce harmful 
pollution levels, support regional development, 
and develop export opportunities. 
Domestic actions are a critical contribution to the 
international process. Domestic actions both 
make practical progress on emissions reduction 
and signal a country’s ambition, commitment and 
expertise to the international community. 
While significant challenges remain in advance of 
Paris, global and domestic politics are now 
dramatically different to those in advance of 
Copenhagen. Domestic actions have increased; 
some of the past negotiating stumbling blocks 
have been smoothed over (like the agreement to 
new Kyoto Protocol targets in 2012); a successful 
agreement is a key foreign policy objective for a 
growing number of countries (for example, the 
USA, the UK, Germany and a diverse range of 
developing nations), and; high level bilateral and 
plurilateral engagement among political leaders is 
occurring well in advance of Paris (for example, 
Ban Ki Moon’s climate summit, G20 summits, G7 
meetings and USA-China bilaterals). 
Decisions expected out of the Lima talks include:  
1. To help transparency and support 
assessment of country targets, definition of 
the information countries need to include in 
the post-2020 contributions they have 
agreed to advance early next year: This, for 
example, is needed to translate the recent 
post-2020 targets by the USA, EU and China 
into the international framework. The Climate 
Institute has produced a separate policy brief 
on Australia’s post-2020 contribution. 
2. Narrow down the elements of the post-2020 
framework: In Copenhagen, countries arrived 
with no broadly supported negotiating text to 
define the parameters of the outcome. This led 
to a chaotic and trust-destroying process. 
Twelve months out from Paris, countries are 
discussing a text which most see as a useful 
basis for agreement. Lima will seek to narrow 
down this text further. 
3. A decision on ways to increase emissions 
reductions ambitions before 2020: 
Recognising the gap between current actions 
and the emissions reductions required to 
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avoid a 2ºC increase in global temperature 
countries have been examining options to 
increase ambition before 2020. 
While the underlying trends in the process remain 
positive, the Lima meeting is likely to involve a 
difficult negotiation process. This is inevitable as 
countries seek to find the balance between clarity 
on core political issues in the negotiations:  
emissions reductions commitments, adaptation, 
climate finance, and the legal form of 
contributions.  
The Climate Institute defines three broad 
scenarios for the outcomes of Lima: 
Stride: Countries make a clear decision on the 
upfront information that nations should advance 
on their post-2020 contributions, and establishes 
a review process on these contributions from June 
2015. Climate financing pledges in advance of 
Lima, and constructive middle ground proposals 
on incorporating adaption and finance into the 
post-2020 framework, give confidence to 
vulnerable developing countries that contributions 
to support adaptation and low carbon 
development will continue. Countries leave Lima 
having narrowed down the options in the draft text 
for the framework to be agreed in Paris.  
Shuffle: Countries agree a decision on the upfront 
information that nations should advance on their 
post-2020 contributions but does not elaborate 
the details of the information to be provided. Lack 
of sufficient progress on climate financing reduces 
the confidence of vulnerable developing countries 
that contributions to support adaptation and low 
carbon development will continue. This stymies 
stronger progress. Countries leave Lima with an 
expansive draft text with much work to be done 
before Paris.  
Collapse: Countries fail to reach agreement on 
the information they need to put forward in their 
post-2020 contributions. Old developed vs 
developing country divides re-emerge over the 
balance between emission reductions, finance 
and adaption in the post-2020 framework. 
Countries leave Lima with no clear mandate to 
narrow down options in the text of the post-2020 
framework.  
Australia is one of the world’s largest economies 
and carbon emitters. Total Australian emissions 
since1990 are the 12th largest of any country. 
Australia is also the developed country most 
exposed to climate impacts.  
To advance Australia’s national interest, and 
demonstrate its support for “strong and effective” 
global action, the Australian government should:  
1. Reaffirm support for warming limits: 
Restate commitment and support to 
participate in a new post-2020 framework 
that is consistent with the national interest of  
limiting global warming to less than 2oC 
above pre-industrial levels. 
2. Declare post 2020 target timeline: 
Announce an independent, transparent 
domestic process to define our initial post-
2020 target offer. In line with other major 
emitters, this offer should be made in early 
2015. Emissions reductions consistent with 
avoiding 2ºC would see Australia reduce net 
emissions by 40 per cent by 2025 and 
decarbonise the economy from around 2040.  
3. Provide Climate Finance: Clearly define its 
contribution to international climate financing, 
in particular investments in the Green Climate 
Fund. Australia’s fair share towards public 
climate finance, including the Green Climate 
Fund, should be no less than $350 million per 
annum. 
4. Ratify Kyoto Protocol II: Make a clear 
commitment to ratification of the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 
advance of the Paris climate summit. 
5. Lift 2020 ambition: Announce the measures 
that it will take to increase ambition before 
2020 in recognition that the minimum 5 per 
cent target is inadequate given global action. 
Low hanging fruit in this regard could include 
using some of the Emissions Reduction Fund 
to purchase credible international emission 
credits under Kyoto II and regulations to limit 
emissions of super greenhouse gases like 
HFCs. 
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Introduction 
 
Governments from around the world will gather in 
Lima, Peru, for the next annual United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) summit Nov 30-Dec 12, 2014. This 
meeting represents an important milestone 
towards defining a new international climate 
change framework for the period from 2020. That 
framework for post-2020 action is to be agreed on 
at the conference in Paris next year.  
Recent announcements by the USA, the EU and 
China on post-2020 emission goals, and pledges 
to climate finance from the USA, Japan and 
others, provide important momentum into the 
Lima conference.  
International climate change negotiations are 
inherently complex as they incorporate 
environmental, economic, security, trade and 
energy issues. Undue emphasis on the politics 
and symbolism of a global treaty has tended to 
overshadow the substantive practical progress 
that has been made. In reality, much has been 
achieved. However domestic actions are still not 
consistent with the internationally agreed goal of 
avoiding a 2oC increase in global temperature 
above preindustrial levels and that of 
decarbonising the global economy.1 
The most recent report of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) said that:2   
“Without additional mitigation efforts beyond 
those in place today, and even with adaptation, 
warming by the end of the 21st century will lead to 
high to very high risk of severe, widespread, and 
irreversible impacts globally (high confidence). 
Mitigation involves some level of co-benefits and 
of risks due to adverse side-effects, but these 
risks do not involve the same possibility of severe, 
widespread, and irreversible impacts as risks from 
climate change, increasing the benefits from near-
term mitigation efforts.” 
That said, countries representing over 80 per cent 
of global emissions have now committed to limit 
or reduce their pollution under UN agreements. 
These are not hollow words or without self-
interested motives. Most countries have 
implemented domestic policies to help meet these 
targets.3 
Countries are implementing policies to drive 
investment in clean energy and low carbon 
solutions for a range of reasons. Many are taking 
a broad view of their national interests and 
seeking to maximise energy security, deliver 
energy productivity improvements, reduce harmful 
pollution levels, support regional development, 
and develop export opportunities (see section on 
domestic policy in 2014). 
While challenging, with political will, the goal of 
avoiding 2ºC warming remains achievable.4 In the 
absence of technologies to capture and 
permanently store carbon pollution, even on 
conservative estimates this would however require 
around a third of current fossil fuel reserves to 
remain in the ground.5 
 
National actions and interests supporting 
international negotiations 
Domestic carbon laws are being implemented 
around the world even as the final shape of an 
international treaty is being negotiated. Over 140 
countries now have renewable energy laws and 
emissions reduction targets.6 Over 39 national and 
23 sub-national jurisdictions have either 
implemented or are considering mechanisms that 
put a price on carbon.7 Nations like the United 
States are also strengthening regulatory measures 
to limit traditional coal use and boost energy 
productivity.8 The next section outlines major 
domestic policies announced in 2014. 
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Domestic actions are a critical contribution to the 
international process, as they both make practical 
progress on emissions reduction and signal a 
country’s ambition, commitment and expertise to 
the international community.  
A possible and important outcome from the 
agreement to be finalised in Paris is a binding 
obligation for countries to implement binding 
domestic laws to help them meet their 
international undertakings.9 
Conversely, international agreements and 
negotiations are crucial underpinnings for 
domestic policy development and build the 
foundations of trust between nations needed to 
drive further global ambition.  
Many of the actions countries are taking are not 
motivated solely by climate policy objectives. The 
realisation that there are multiple co-benefits of 
action has been another important development 
since Copenhagen. 
For example, China is acting to limit the damaging 
impact of air pollution on the population’s health 
and economy, and enhance domestic energy 
security. As an emerging super power, China also 
wants to enhance its international influence by 
contributing to an issue that will help shape 
international affairs over this century. Climate 
change is also a consideration because the 
government sees clean energy and low pollution 
technologies as a key driver in reshaping its 
economy and delivering future export 
opportunities. China recognises that climate 
change itself will have significant impact on China 
and its internal stability.   
Other countries have other national interest 
drivers. For example, the survival of many small 
island states depends on strong international 
action.  
It is reasonable to conclude that many countries 
that are taking a broader and long-term view of 
their national interest will be best positioned to 
gain from the transition underway.  Early 
participation can enable positive influence on 
international outcomes, help manage the 
inevitable transition to a decarbonised economy, 
and take advantage of the economic opportunities 
that action on climate change presents.   
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Policy developments in 2014 
 
JANUARY 
The nine northeast US states of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) carbon market 
tighten the market limit by 45 per cent, boosting 
carbon prices. California’s carbon market 
officially links with that of Quebec, Canada.  
China brings forward to 2014 its target of limiting 
coal to less than 65 per cent of energy use (last 
year it set 2017 as the deadline). China’s Hubei 
province (pop. 57.6 million) invites its five 
neighbouring provinces to join its emissions 
trading scheme on a voluntary basis. 
EU Parliament votes for the world's toughest 
carbon dioxide standards for new cars. Mexico 
launches a $3/tonne carbon tax on fossil fuels.10 
 
FEBRUARY 
China announces plans for a 10 billion yuan 
($2.84 billion) fund to fight air pollution. State 
news reports that Beijing will shut down 300 
polluting factories this year and publish a list of 
industrial projects to be halted or. China’s 
Qingdao city (pop. 3 million) proposes launch of 
its own carbon market next year, capping 
emissions of 300 of its largest companies.  
US President Barack Obama orders new, higher 
fuel standards for trucks to be proposed by March 
2015 and implemented by March 2016.  
Massachusetts requires a new gas-fired power 
plant to meet declining emissions limits and close 
down by 2049. Colorado sets the US’ first 
emission controls on oil and natural gas 
operations. 
 
 
MARCH 
EU governments start “backloading” – cutting the 
supply of new carbon permits into the EU ETS by 
53 per cent – to address oversupply and low 
prices.  EU parliament votes to phase down HFC 
use by two-thirds by 2030, reducing emissions by 
1.5 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent 
(CO2e). EU leaders set October deadline to agree 
2030 climate and energy goals.  
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang says the government 
will “declare war’’ on air pollution by removing 
high emission cars from the road, closing coal-
fired furnaces and capping energy use. The 
Chinese government announces that companies 
emitting over 13,000 tonnes of CO2e annually will 
be required to start reporting their emissions, 
ahead of a national carbon market.  
Chongqing’s carbon market proposes that 250 of 
its biggest companies cut their carbon emissions 
by more than 4 per cent per year starting in 2014.  
Guangdong announces plans to increase carbon 
costs for power generators within its carbon 
market, to speed up emission cuts. Guangdong’s 
carbon market expands coverage to buildings and 
transport sectors. 
Hubei issues 324 million carbon permits ahead of 
its carbon market launch on April 2. 
Shanghai announces plans to get its citizens 
driving more than 10,000 electric or hybrid cars by 
2015, by offering subsidies and installing charging 
stations.  
US announces plans to replace super-potent 
HFCs with lower-emission chemicals in motor 
vehicle air conditioners, commercial refrigeration, 
plastic foam products, and consumer aerosols. 
Chile plans a tax on carbon emissions.  
Kazakhstan’s carbon market launches. 
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APRIL 
France sets a new EUR 7/tonne ($8/tonne) carbon 
tax on coal, natural gas, heating oil and from 2015 
liquid fuels. Next year the tax is set to rise to EUR 
14 ($16/tonne) and to EUR 22 ($25/tonne) in 2016. 
Hubei’s carbon market launches in China. 
 
MAY 
Brazil sets final rules for forest use, allows 
tradable credits in an effort to encourage 
reforestation. 
EU announces it’s on track to reduce emissions 
by nearly 25 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020, 
beating its 20 per cent target.  
 
JUNE 
US EPA proposes rules to cut carbon pollution 
from power plants by 30 per cent by 2030.  
Japan and India plan carbon offset deal. China 
launches its seventh pilot carbon market in 
Chongqing city. 
World Bank says global GDP could rise by $2.6 
trillion a year through improved energy efficiency, 
waste management and public transport.  
 
JULY 
India expands support for solar energy projects 
and raises its tax on coal production to 100 INR 
($6) per tonne. 
Switzerland warns it will raise its tax on energy 
emissions by 40 per cent if companies fail to cut 
carbon by 24 per cent below 1990 levels this year.  
Germany pledges EUR 750 million ($0.9 billion) to 
the UN Green Climate Fund, set up to finance 
carbon reduction and adaptation in developing 
countries.  
China releases plan to boost electric and low-
emission vehicles. 
Mexico plans to tighten emissions rules for 
heavy-duty trucks and signs pact to cooperate 
with California on advancing cross-border 
investments in clean energy. 
 
AUGUST 
Beijing, China brings another 120 companies into 
its carbon market, up from 490 when it launched 
last year. 
SEPTEMBER 
China releases draft pollution law that considers a 
national cap on coal consumption and a ban on 
the import of low-quality coal.  
South Korea confirms emissions cap ahead of 
carbon market launch next year.  
Chile imposes South America’s first carbon tax: 
$5 per tonne on emissions from power generators.  
France pledges $1 billion to the Green Climate 
Fund.  
Mexico, South Korea, Denmark, Luxembourg 
and the Czech Republic also make pledges 
bringing the GCF’s total to $2.3 billion.  
The EU promises $3 billion to help developing 
countries cut carbon.  
The US and India agree to a strategic partnership 
on energy security, clean energy, and climate 
change.  India agrees to support a global phase-
down of HFCs. 
 
OCTOBER 
Canada launches the world's first commercial-
scale carbon capture and storage project at a 
coal-fired power plant.  
Sweden announces $500 million for Green 
Climate Fund.  
The EU confirms its 2030 climate and energy 
targets: a cut in carbon pollution of at least 40 per 
cent below 1990 levels, 27 per cent of total energy 
to come from renewable sources, and a 27 per 
cent improvement in energy efficiency  compared 
with projected consumption. 
 
NOVEMBER 
US and China announce their broad-brush post 
post-2020 emission reduction targets. The USA 
indicates 26-28 per cent emissions reductions on 
2005 levels by 2025. China flags a peak in national 
emissions before 2030. 
The US indicates it will contribute US$3 billion in 
climate financing to the Green Climate Fund. 
Japan indicates a US$1.5 billion contribution. 
G20 reinforces that countries should seek to 
advance their post-2020 emission reduction goals 
well in advance of Paris (and by April for those 
countries in a position to do so) and reiterates 
support for the Green Climate Fund. 
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From Copenhagen to Lima 
 
While current international commitments remain 
insufficient to limit global warming to less than 
2°C, international climate change negotiations 
have made significant advances over recent years:  
 Copenhagen 2009 – “Copenhagen Accord” 
asks countries to advance 2020 emission 
targets, agreement on the need to avoid 2oC in 
global temperature, and sets the ambition of 
public and private sector climate financing to 
$100 billion by 2020;11 
 Cancun 2010, which enshrined for the first 
time a commitment to reduce emissions from 
all major emitters under the UN framework;12 
 Durban 2011, which secured an agreement to 
finalise a binding agreement covering 
quantified emission commitments from all 
major emitters;13 
 Doha 2012, where countries agreed the next 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol and 
streamlined the pathway towards the binding 
agreement in Paris in 2015;14 and 
 Warsaw 2013, where countries agreed to 
define a draft negotiating text in 2014 so it can 
be considered in Lima, and all countries were 
invited to initiate domestic preparations to 
advance their post-2020 contributions  well in 
advance of the Paris summit (by the first 
quarter of 2015 by those countries ready to do 
so).15 
While significant challenges remain in advance of 
Paris, global geopolitical and domestic situations 
today are dramatically different to those in 
advance of Copenhagen. Domestic actions have 
increased, some of the past negotiating stumbling 
blocks have been smoothed over (like the 
agreement to implement new Kyoto Protocol 
targets), a successful agreement is a key foreign 
policy objective for a growing number of countries 
(for example, the USA, the UK, Germany, and a 
diverse range of developing countries), and high 
level bilateral and plurilateral engagement among 
political leaders is occurring well in advance of 
Paris (for example, Ban Ki Moon’s climate summit, 
G20 and G7 meetings and USA-China bilaterals). 
Internationally, more and more countries are 
seeing effective global action on climate change 
as central to their long-term national interests. 
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Key decisions at the Lima 
climate summit 
 
The Lima 2014 climate summit is an important 
milestone towards Paris. Decisions expected out 
of the talks include:  
1. Define the information countries need to 
include when they advance their post-2020 
emission contributions next year: All major 
emitters have targets to control carbons 
emissions to 2020, for example Australia has 
agreed to reduce emission by 5-25 per cent 
on 2000 levels by 2020. These targets are 
captured under the Kyoto Protocol and/or the 
Cancun Agreements. Last year in Warsaw, 
countries agreed to start domestic processes 
to define new contributions to global action 
on climate change for the period post-2020. 
Defining the information countries should 
advance would allow for the translation of the 
targets already advanced by the USA, China 
and the EU, and those to be advanced next 
year into the international framework.  (The 
Climate Institute has produced a separate 
policy brief on Australia’s post-2020 
contribution.16) 
2. Narrow down the elements of the post-
2020 framework: In Copenhagen, countries 
arrived with no broadly supported negotiating 
text to define the parameters of the outcome. 
This led to a chaotic and trust-destroying 
process. Twelve months out from Paris, 
countries are discussing a text which most 
see as a useful basis for agreement. Lima will 
seek to narrow down this text further. A draft 
negotiating text needs to be sent to the UN in 
May 2015 to meet the legal requirements for 
agree a new legal instrument under the 
UNFCCC in Paris. 
3. A decision on ways to increase emissions 
reductions ambitions before 2020: 
Recognising the gap between current actions 
and the emissions reductions required to 
avoid a 2ºC increase in global temperature 
countries have been examining options to 
increase ambition before 2020. With the 
UNFCCC, process countries have been 
examining options to increase ambition 
through energy efficiency, renewable energy, 
and short-term emission reduction options. 
This process has been valuable in 
demonstrating best practices, and 
demonstrating the economic benefits of 
certain actions. 
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Balancing mitigation, 
adaptation and finance 
 
Central to any outcome in Lima will be finding the 
balance between capturing emissions reductions 
contributions, and the other three the key political 
issues17 in the post-2020 framework negotiations: 
 Adaptation: Over time, discussions of how to 
facilitate adaptation to climate change under 
the UNFCCC have become increasingly 
prominent. This issue is a high priority for 
many countries in the developing world, in 
particular the Alliance of Small Island States 
(AOSIS), the Africa Group, and the Least 
Developed Countries (LDCs). Current 
discussions focus around issues about the 
establishment of a global adaptation goal, 
whether all nations should be submitting plans 
on how they adapt to the impacts of climate 
change, and the financial support the most 
vulnerable may need in addressing 
unavoidable climate change impacts.  There is 
a risk that disagreements regarding adaptation 
(and finance below) will fall into traditional 
developed versus developing patterns and 
shape the broader dynamic of the Lima 
meeting.  
 Climate finance: In the context of emissions 
reductions efforts from all countries, 
developed countries have agreed to facilitate 
US$100 billion by 2020 in public and private 
finance to help developing countries reduce 
emissions and adapt to climate impacts. 
Although private finance, in particular, is 
increasing, progress on public financing goal 
has been slow. Until recently, developed 
countries have been slow to share plans for 
scaling up their contributions, and the Green 
Climate Fund (GCF), a central vehicle for 
public finance disbursement. About $8 billion 
is currently pledged in public contributions. 
More pledges will likely be announced ahead 
of Lima.  
It is important for developing countries that 
developed countries follow through on their 
financing commitments, so close attention will 
be paid to the GCF pledges. Countries are 
divided over the treatment of finance in the 
Paris agreement, with some wanting to include 
finance as an element of countries’ national 
targets and others aiming to keep the issue on 
a separate track.  
 Legal form: In the past, the symbolism of 
failing to agree a new legally binding treaty has 
distracted from the progress that has been 
made domestically and internationally to 
reduce emissions. Legally binding instruments 
can build confidence that countries will act on 
the commitments they make internationally. 
However, the legal form of an international 
agreement does not determine its 
effectiveness.18 The most binding treaty will do 
little to address climate change if some major 
emitters like the US and China do not 
participate. Also, countries continue to 
implement policies to meet their current 2020 
targets even if they and not strictly speaking 
internationally binding. For example, the US 
does not have a binding 2020 target, but is 
implementing policies that have legal force at a 
domestic level to achieve this target (e.g. 
regulations to control emissions from vehicles 
and power stations). 
To balance ambition and boost participation in 
the post-2020 framework, countries are moving 
towards a hybrid agreement which includes a 
new legally binding instrument at its core, 
including a binding commitment to attach a 
target to the post-2020 framework. However 
the emission reduction commitments attached 
to this agreement may not themselves be 
internationally binding. This outcome would 
likely achieve the best possible emission 
reduction outcomes in the medium term. 
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From Lima to Paris and 
beyond 
 
Figure 1 outlines the process from Lima to Paris 
and beyond. The UNFCCC process is, by its, 
nature an evolving process. For example, the 
Paris outcome will provide a broad framework but 
some issues will require elaboration and operative 
decisions to be agreed over the period 2016-19. 
This occurred with the Kyoto Protocol and is not 
unlike Australia’s law making processes – 
legislation is passed then in many cased 
regulations need to be agreed to operationalise 
elements of the law.  
Key deadlines after Lima are: 
 First quarter 2015: Countries in a position to 
do so to advance post-2020 contributions. 
The US, EU and China appear likely to meet 
this deadline at least given they have already 
announces the board parameters for their 
contributions. 
 Second quarter 2015: Draft agreement 
negotiating text circulated by May. Other 
major emitters advance their post-2020 
contributions. 
 Third and fourth quarters 2015: International 
process to review and scrutinise post-2020 
contributions and how they relate to the 
collective 2ºC goal. 
 December 2015: Paris summit – new legally 
binding instrument agreed, with supporting 
decisions and political declarations.  
 Post 2015: Implementing decisions agreed, 
and domestic ratification processes 
undertaken. 
 2020: New agreement applicable to all starts. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 – Timeline for the development of the post-2020 framework. 
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Money talking 
Carbon and climate risks being mainstreamed 
 
The financial sector has been moving rapidly on 
climate issues this year, partly thanks to growing 
awareness of fossil fuel companies’ assets 
becoming stranded and “unburnable” if the world 
acts to avoid a 2ºC increase on global 
temperature.  
In 2011 Carbon Tracker, a UK-based think tank, 
released a report which found that only about a 
fifth of global fossil fuel resources can be burned if 
the world is to maintain a good (80 per cent) 
chance of limiting global warming to 2ºC.19 A year 
later, the International Energy Agency adopted the 
approach.20 
Investors in Australian stock markets are 
particularly exposed to the carbon risk through the 
local stock market's heavy resource bias; 
particularly in coal. Australian-focused research by 
The Climate Institute and Carbon Tracker shows 
that if all the coal resources of listed companies is 
burnt, Australia would eat up around three-
quarters of the global carbon limit that is 
consistent with avoiding 2ºC of warming.21 In 
other words, Australia is quite vulnerable to a 
"stranded assets" scenario in which previously 
valuable reserves become worthless. 
JANUARY 
Global banks support Green Bond Principles: The 
announcement from banks including Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch, Citi, Crédit Agricole, 
JPMorgan Chase, BNP Paribas, Daiwa, Deutsche 
Bank, Goldman Sachs, HSBC, and Morgan Stanley 
paves the way for more issuance of these fast-
growing financial instruments.  
United Nations Environment Program launches an 
inquiry into policy options for a sustainable financial 
system, due to report in 2015. The inquiry’s 
background report points out that the Basel III bank 
capital rules act as a disincentive to financing low 
carbon investments.  
Foundations worth $1.8 billion pledge to divest from 
fossil fuels and invest in clean energy. The group 
includes Wallace Global Fund and John Merck Fund. 
 
FEBRUARY 
A group of investors file shareholder resolutions with 
10 energy companies, including ExxonMobil, 
demanding disclosure of their business strategies for 
a low carbon future. 
 
MARCH 
Norway sets up an expert group to see if its $840 
billion oil fund should stop investing in fossil fuel 
companies. The group will report back in 2015. 
BP writes in its annual sustainability review that "we 
believe the unburnable carbon approach... 
overstates the potential financial impact." The UK 
House of Commons' environmental audit committee 
says the Bank of England should take advice from 
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the Committee on Climate Change to monitor the 
risks to financial stability.  
ExxonMobil publishes two reports disclosing its 
assumptions on climate risk in response to 
shareholder proposals. The company says it accepts 
that carbon dioxide from fossil fuels is creating 
potentially dangerous increases to global 
temperatures, but also said it was "highly unlikely" 
that greenhouse gas emissions will be sufficiently 
regulated to achieve the 2ºC target, and that it is 
therefore "confident that none of our hydrocarbon 
reserves are now or will become 'stranded'." 
 
APRIL 
The IPCC says investment in fossil fuel energy 
generation needs to fall by $30 billion a year, while 
investment in low-carbon plants – nuclear, 
renewables and carbon capture – needs to rise $147 
billion a year with a further $336 billion per year in 
transport, buildings and industry will be needed to 
keep global warming to 2ºC. 
FTSE and Blackrock team up to launch the first 
indices from a leading index group that specifically 
bar fossil fuel companies. 
 
MAY 
Stanford University's $18.7 billion endowment fund 
announces it will sell its investments in companies 
involved in coal mining. Harvard University students 
blockade administrative offices as part of their 
campaign to persuade the institution to sell its 
endowment's investments in fossil fuel companies.  
$1.1 trillion of planned capital expenditure identified 
at risk: Carbon Tracker Initiative research finds that 
planned investments over the next decade in oil 
sands, deepwater and Arctic oil extraction will be 
lost if policymakers agree to cut carbon emissions. 
 
JUNE 
The report "Risky Business: The Economic Risks of 
Climate Change in the United States," is launched by 
high profile financial experts including former 
Treasury Secretaries George Shultz, Rob Rubin and 
Hank Paulson, with Michael Bloomberg and Tom 
Steyer.  
 
 
JULY 
Credit ratings agency Standard & Poor's publishes a 
report on carbon constraints for the coal sector, 
saying "a significant decline in production and 
consumption is becoming a much more realistic 
scenario". 
 
SEPTEMBER 
Investors representing $500 billion worth of assets 
take the Montreal Carbon Pledge to carbon footprint 
their portfolios. Institutional investors representing 
over $24 trillion in assets call on governments to 
provide stable and reliable carbon pricing and phase 
out subsidies for fossil fuels. The Low Carbon 
Investment Registry, a global public online database 
of low carbon investments made by institutional 
investors, launches. 
Oxford University's Smith School of Enterprise and 
the Environment publishes a paper finding that 
investment strategies based on ESG principles 
correlate to higher returns. HESTA, one of Australia's 
largest superannuation funds, announces portfolio-
wide restrictions on new investments in thermal coal. 
Medium-sized Australian super fund LG Super 
announces it will sell holdings of shares in companies 
with significant exposure to oil sands or coal. 
MSCI launches a family of low-carbon indices at the 
request of several asset owners and managers. The 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund announces it will divest 
from fossil fuels. New Climate Economy launches the 
"Better Growth, Better Climate” report, which points 
to vast benefits to global economy from sustainable 
infrastructure investment and reduction of fossil fuel 
and fertiliser subsidies. The New Climate Economy 
group is chaired by former Mexican president Felipe 
Calderon and Nicholas Stern.  
 
OCTOBER 
Glasgow University announces it will divest its entire 
endowment from fossil fuels. Sweden's national 
pension fund announces it will divest from 20 fossil 
fuel companies. Investors managing more than $3 
trillion of assets demand 45 of the world’s top oil and 
gas, coal and electric power companies assess the 
financial risks that climate change poses to their 
business plans, under the umbrella of the Carbon 
Asset Risk initiative (CAR).
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Scenarios for Lima 
 
While the underlying trends in the process remain 
positive, the Lima meeting is likely to involve a 
difficult negotiation process. This is inevitable as 
countries seek to find the balance between clarity 
on emissions reductions commitments, 
adaptation, and finance. 
The Climate Institute defines three broad 
scenarios for the outcomes of Lima: 
 Stride: Countries make a decision on the 
upfront information that nations should 
advance on their post-2020 contributions. This 
includes a clear list of the information to be 
included (e.g. 2025 or 2030 targets), and 
establishes a review process on these 
contributions from June 2015. Climate 
financing pledges in advance of Lima give 
confidence to vulnerable developing countries 
that contributions to support adaptation and 
low carbon development will continue. Middle-
ground developed and developing countries 
advance concrete proposals that see a 
balance being struck between emissions 
reductions, climate finance, and adaptation 
tracks in the negotiations. This includes a 
political parity between these three elements 
being achieved, and a clear process forward 
on how adaptation and finance will be 
integrated as central features of post-2020 
framework.  Countries leave Lima having 
narrowed down in draft text the options for the 
framework to be agreed in Paris. A high-level 
forum is created to feed into the Paris meeting 
on how countries can increase their ambition 
before 2020. 
 Shuffle: Countries agree a decision on the 
upfront information that nations should 
advance on their post-2020 contributions. This 
reiterates that the information be transparent 
but does not elaborate the details of the 
information to be provided. Low climate 
financing pledges around Lima reduce 
confidence of vulnerable developing countries 
that contributions to support adaptation and 
low carbon development will continue.  Lack 
or middle group proposals from progressive 
developed and developing countries weakens 
progress on how adaptation and finance will 
be integrated as a central feature of post-2020 
framework. A process on these elements is 
agreed, but it lacks definition. Countries leave 
Lima with a loose framework still to be agreed 
in Paris. Significant consolidation is required in 
early 2015 to meet May deadlines for a 
negotiating text. A high-level forum is created 
to feed into the Paris meeting on how 
countries can increase their ambition before 
2020. 
 Collapse: Countries fail to reach agreement 
on the information they need to put forward in 
their post-2020 contributions. Old developed 
vs developing country divides re-emerge over 
the balance between emission reductions, 
finance and adaption in the post-2020 
framework. Countries leave Lima with no 
mandate to narrow down options in the text of 
the post-2020 framework. 
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Australia’s role 
Achieving influence for the national interest
 
Australia is one of the world largest economies 
and carbon emitters:22 
1. As a member of the G20, Australia’s economy 
the 19th largest in the world and accounts for 
around one per cent of global GDP. Per 
capita income is the 13th highest globally and 
3rd among the G20 nations. 
2. Australia is the 13th largest carbon pollution 
emitter globally and accounts for around 1.3 
per cent of global emissions. Australia total 
emissions are higher than a range of other 
G20 nations such as the United Kingdom, 
Saudi Arabia, France, Italy and South Africa. 
Since 1990 total emissions from Australia are 
the 12th largest of any country. 
3. In per capita terms, Australia emission ranks 
8th globally and is the highest per capita 
emitter in the G20 (and the OECD). 
Australia’s high emissions, economy and per 
capita income (and therefore strong capacity to 
act to reduce emissions), and diplomatic influence 
is also reflected in its membership of the G20, the 
Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate23, 
and as chair of the Umbrella Group24 within the 
UNFCCC. 
As a country very exposed to climate change, it is 
in Australia’s national interest for short-term 
collective action to be consistent with the agreed 
long-term objective of international action to limit 
global warming to less than 2ºC above 
preindustrial levels. Warming above this level 
would have severe impacts on the natural systems 
on which we depend, significantly increase risks 
to health from more extreme climate events, and 
exceed the adaptive capacity of many key 
economic sectors.25 
To advance, Australia’s national interest in strong 
and effective global action the Australian 
government should:  
1. Reaffirm support for warming limits:  
Restate the government’s commitment to 
participate in a new post-2020 framework 
that is consistent with the national interest of 
avoiding a 2ºC in global temperature above 
pre-industrial levels. 
2. Declare post 2020 target timeline:  
Announce an independent, transparent 
domestic process to define our initial post-
2020 target offer. In line with other major 
emitters, this offer should be made in early 
2015. The Climate Institute has previous 
published a policy brief on the approach 
Australia should take in advancing post-2020 
contributions consistent with the agreed 2ºC 
goal.26 This includes 40 per cent net 
emissions reductions by 2025 and a clear 
national decarbonisation goal by 2040-2050. 
3. Provide Climate Finance:  Clearly define its 
contribution to international climate financing, 
in particular, to the capitalisation of the Green 
Climate Fund. Australia should allocate an 
annual average of no less than $350 million to 
climate finance through bilateral and 
multilateral mechanisms that include the 
Green Climate Fund. Australia should 
maintain its proactive approach to 
strengthening transparency and 
accountability in climate financing. 
4. Ratify Kyoto Protocol II: Make a clear 
commitment to ratification of the second 
commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol in 
advance of the Paris climate summit. 
Agreement to Kyoto Protocol targets covering 
the period from 2013-2020 was an essential 
trusting building measure that enabled an 
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agreement to finalise a new agreement 
applicable to all countries in Paris. Australia 
signed onto the second commitment period 
with bipartisan political support in 2012, and 
has since aligned its domestic policies (like 
the Emission Reduction Fund) to comply with 
this second Kyoto Protocol target.  The Kyoto 
Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism 
has been a key driver of investment in 
developing countries and assisted the 
development of emissions accounting 
frameworks as well as carbon markets.  
Importantly, it is a source of credible 
international offsets that, subject to 
ratification, could be accessed by Australia or 
Australian companies. 
5. Lift 2020 Ambition:  Alongside the 
development of its national post-2020 
contribution, Australia should announce the 
measures that it will take to increase ambition 
before 2020.  
Given the level of global action the minimum 
“unconditional” target of 5 per cent below 
2000 levels is inadequate.  Conditions shared 
internationally for a higher reduction target 
have been met.  A number of independent 
assessments of the bi-partisan backed 
conditions conclude the 2020 target should 
be at least 15 per cent by 2020.27-292829 
With low global carbon prices and low 
electricity demand these targets and more are 
achievable. Low hanging fruit in this regard 
could include:  
 the establishment of a strategic reserve 
under the Emission Reduction Fund to 
purchase credible Kyoto II international 
emission credits to increasepre-2020 
ambition and support international 
carbon markets;30 
 regulations to limit emissions of super 
industrial greenhouse gases like HFCs;31 
 set light and heavy vehicle emission 
standards;32 and 
 regulations to exit aging and inefficient 
coal-fired electricity capacity.33 
Any significant emissions reductions will require 
clear emission limits on large domestic emitters. 
This would ensure major emitters not taxpayers 
take primary responsibility for achieving our 
emission reduction goals at least cost. The debate 
over the Government’s proposed ‘safeguards 
mechanism’ during 2015 and the review of 
emissions trading to be conducted by the Climate 
Change Authority provide opportunities to revisit 
this area of policy. 
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